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TOWARDS GREATER OPENNESS IN JUDICIAL CONDUCT
COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS: TEMPORARY CONFIDENTIALITY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INVIOLATE CONFIDENTIALITY-Garner v. Cherberg, 111 Wash. 2d 811, 765 P.2d 1284
(1988).
Abstract: In Garnerv. Cherberg,the Washington Supreme Court upheld certain rules of
inviolate confidentiality adopted by the Washington Commission on Judicial Conduct.
This Note examines the justifications for such confidentiality rules, and proposes temporary, rather than inviolate, confidentiality to better balance interests of fairness and the
public's right to know.

Confidentiality in judicial misconduct proceedings has been a source
of constant friction since the creation of the first state judicial conduct
commission twenty-nine years ago. Confidentiality rules are intended
to maintain fairness in the proceedings for the protection of all participants. Such rules, however, collide with the public's right to know
about judicial misconduct. Moreover, such rules prevent the public
from determining when a judicial conduct commission has abused or
misused its discretion in dismissing complaints against judges. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to maintain public confidence in
the judiciary and the legal system.
In Garner v. Cherberg,1 the Washington Supreme Court sought to
reconcile fairness interests with the public's right to know. In Garner,
the Washington State Senate Committee on Rules issued a subpoena
duces tecum to the Washington Commission on Judicial Conduct
("CJC") z for files on Judge Gary Little. The senate was investigating
CJC activity to determine an appropriate legislative response to the
CJC's handling of complaints against Judge Little. The CJC had
secretly admonished Little in 1982 for ex parte contacts with juveniles,
but had taken no action on similar complaints in 1984 and 1985. The
public was unaware of these events. Little, running unopposed, automatically retained his seat on the bench in the 1984 election. In 1988,
Judge Little killed himself amid allegations that prior to his election in
1980 to the superior court he sexually molested young men.
The court quashed the senate's subpoena, upholding confidentiality
laws designed to maintain fairness. Then, legitimating the public's
1. 111 Wash. 2d 811, 765 P.2d 1284 (1988).
2. In 1987, the Judicial Qualifications Commission was renamed the Commission on Judicial
Conduct. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT RULE l(a) ("CJC RULE") (rev. Apr. 3, 1987).
In this Note, "CJC" will denote both the Judicial Qualifications Commission and the
Commission on Judicial Conduct.
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countervailing right to be informed, the court granted legislative representatives limited access to the files. This tortured approach illustrates the tensions inherent in balancing the needs of the public with
fairness. Although intended to promote such fairness, confidentiality
rules instead undermine it.
This Note examines the need for confidentiality in CJC proceedings.
Confidentiality is necessary to allow uninhibited CJC investigations
and to protect judges from unscreened attacks. However, keeping files
secret after disposition of a complaint deprives the public of its right to
monitor the exercise of CJC discretion. This Note proposes that the
legislature adopt "temporary confidentiality" in CJC proceedings.
Temporary confidentiality means that ongoing investigations or hearings are confidential until the complaint is disposed of, then all files are
opened to the public. This system at once ensures overall fairness and
accommodates the public's right to know.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Judicial Conduct Commissions: An Overview of Proceduresand
Confidentiality Provisions
States use one of two basic models for investigating and acting on
allegations of judicial misconduct or disability.3 Although all jurisdictions' procedures for handling complaints are similar,4 the point where
confidentiality ends and proceedings become public varies significantly. In twenty-four states, including Washington, confidentiality
3. See I. TESITOR & D. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2d ed. 1980).
Washington has a "one-tier" system, as do 40 other states and the District of Columbia. A single
commission investigates and adjudicates complaints, then recommends discipline to the state
supreme court. In the "two-tier" system, one body receives and investigates complaints. If that
body finds probable cause for disciplinary action or removal, the case is handed to a separate
body for adjudication. Id.
4. The Washington CJC procedure typifies one-tier models. Upon receipt of a complaint, the
CJC Executive Director makes an initial determination whether the complaint falls within CJC
jurisdiction as a possible violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. If not, the CJC dismisses the
complaint. But if the complaint may represent a violation, the CJC solicits a verified statement
from the party, the judge is notified, and "initial proceedings" commence.
After investigation, if the CJC finds insufficient grounds for further proceedings, the CJC takes
no action. But if the CJC determines that probable cause exists that the judge has violated a rule
of judicial conduct, the CJC can either publicly admonish or reprimand the judge, or order the
filing of a statement of charges to begin a public fact-finding hearing.
After the hearing, charges may be dropped, or if the CJC concludes that clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence of a violation exists, then the CJC can either dispose of the matter with an
admonishment or reprimand, or recommend to the supreme court that the judge be disciplined,
removed, or retired. See CJC RULES 5, 6, 8, 16 (rev. May 5, 1989); Public Hearing for the
Commission on Washington Courts 102-22 (Jan. 24, 1989) (statement of E. Garner, Executive
Director, CJC).

Confidentiality in Judicial Conduct
ends with a finding of probable cause of a violation and the subsequent
filing of a formal complaint against the judge.5 Nineteen states go further and conduct secret fact-finding hearings, ending confidentiality
only when a recommendation for discipline is filed with the state
supreme court. Eight states and the District of Columbia maintain
confidentiality until discipline is ordered by the state supreme court.6
Thus, all fifty-one jurisdictions provide some degree of confidentiality.
Confidentiality is considered essential in judicial conduct proceedings to promote fairness. 7 Its traditional justifications include:
Encouraging complaints by providing protection from possible retribution or recrimination; protecting judges from injury resulting from
publication of unexamined and unwarranted complaints; maintaining
the integrity of the judiciary by avoiding premature announcement of
groundless claims of judicial misconduct or disability;8 encouraging
retirement as an alternative to costly and lengthy formal hearings;9
protecting commission members from outside pressures;1 ° and avoiding media exploitation.11 Such justifications, however, potentially conflict with the public's growing desire to be informed. The number of
federal and state freedom of information laws, 12 sunshine laws, and
similar legislation demonstrates that the public believes it has a right
3
to information about its government.1

5. Bolanos, Confidentiality Survey Results, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Fall 1987/Winter 1988, at
4, 4-5. In Washington the investigation file remains permanently confidential; it is never opened
to the public. The formal complaint, drafted from the investigation file, is publicized and
becomes the first document in the then-public file. CJC RULE 7(a) (rev. May 5, 1989). Under
proposed 1989 legislation, however, the records forming the basis of the findings of probable
cause also would be subject to disclosure. Commission on Judicial Conduct, 1989 Wash. Legis.
Serv. 367 (West) § 6. See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
6. Bolanos, supra note 5, at 4-5.
7. See I. TESITOR & D. SINKS, supra note 3, at 47.

8. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 833 (1978).
9. Shaman & B6gu6, Silence Isn't Always Golden: Reassessing Confidentiality in the Judicial
DisciplinaryProcess, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 755, 765 (1985).
10. Stern v. Morgenthau, 62 N.Y.2d 331, 465 N.E.2d 349, 353, 476 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1984).
11. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? 67 (1971).
12. All 50 states and the federal government have freedom of information laws providing a
right of public access to government records. Shaman & B~gu&, supra note 9, at 784.
13. The Washington Public Disclosure Act provides: "That, mindful of the right of
individuals to privacy and of the desirability of the efficient administration of government, full
access to information concerning the conduct of government on every level must be assured as a
fundamental and necessary precondition to the sound governance of a free society." WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.17.010(11) (1989):
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The Washington Commission on Judicial Conduct

In 1980, Washington became the last state to create a judicial conduct commission 4 when Washington voters passed amendment
seventy-one to their state constitution."' The amendment directed the
CJC to "establish rules of procedure for [CJC] proceedings including
. . . confidentiality of proceedings."' 6 In 1981, the legislature
responded with a statute, again mandating that the CJC establish rules
of confidentiality.17 The CJC then adopted rules requiring confidentiality in all CJC proceedings until it made a recommendation to the
supreme court for discipline.1 8
In 1986 Washington voters amended the constitution again, to provide for confidentiality only through "initial proceedings."' 9 The
stated intent of the amendment was to increase public confidence in
the judiciary by introducing openness into the CJC process.2 0
Although the amendment provided for public viewing of hearings if
they occurred, the constitution mandated that all initial proceedings of
the CJC remained cloaked in secrecy. 2"
14. See I. TESITOR & D. SINKS, supra note 3, at 2.

15. Garner v. Cherberg, 111 Wash. 2d 811, 813, 765 P.2d 1284, 1285 (1988).
16. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31 (1980, amend. 71, amended 1986, amend. 77).
17. Judicial Qualifications Commission-Appropriation, 1981 Wash. Laws 268, § 12. The
only role for the legislature articulated in the original constitutional amendment was to "provide
for commissioners' terms of office and compensation," WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31, but the
legislation also addressed CJC discovery powers, CJC budget reports, and rules for
confidentiality. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.64.060, .100, .110 (1989). Why the legislature felt
compelled or authorized to pass legislation exceeding the constitutional dictate is unclear.
18. CJC RULE 4(a), (b) (adopted Oct. 14, 1981).
19. See WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31 (1986, amend. 77); CJC RULE 6(b), (e) (rev. Apr. 3,
1987).
20. OFFICE OF THE WASH. SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTERS & CANDIDATES PAMPHLET 8-9
(6th ed. 1986). It has been alleged that the CJC's amendment of its rules subsequent to the
constitutional amendment subverted the voters' intent. When the amendment was passed, CJC
Rule 5 was titled "Initial Proceedings." CJC RULE 5 (rev. Sept. 1, 1984). Rule 6, titled
"Preliminary Investigation," provided for informal disposition of complaints. CJC RULE 6 (rev.
Sept. 1, 1984). According to the allegations, the language of the amendment was purposeful; the
intent was to provide for confidentiality only through "initial proceedings" under the 1984 CJC
Rules. The effect of this would have been to make public the informal disposition of complaints
under CJC Rule 6.
The CJC, however, subsequent to the passage of the constitutional amendment, reversed the
titles of Rules 5 and 6 when it revised the Rules. CJC RULES 5, 6 (rev. Apr. 3, 1987). Thus, Rule
5 became "Preliminary Investigation" and Rule 6 was retitled "Initial Proceedings." Id. This
brought informal disposition of complaints within the section titled "Initial Proceedings,"
ensuring that the CJC could continue to admonish or reprimand judges in private.
21.

WASH. CONST. art. IV,

§ 31

(1986, amend. 77).

Confidentiality in Judicial Conduct
C. History of the Judge Little Case
In 1981, the King County Prosecutor's Office prepared a 107-pluspage report alleging improper ex parte contacts 22 between Judge
Little2 3 and male juveniles under the jurisdiction of the King County
Superior Court.24 The CJC privately admonished Little in March of
1982.25 In January of 1984, the prosecutor's office advised the CJC
that Little had again engaged in ex parte contact with a juvenile in
violation of the CJC's admonition. 26 The CJC dismissed these allegations due to insufficient evidence. 2 Because CJC proceedings were
secret, the public was unaware of these events and Little, unopposed in
the 1984 election, retained his seat on the bench without his name
28
even appearing on the ballot.
In April, 1985, then-presiding Judge Quinn permanently removed
Little from the juvenile bench for his ex parte contacts with
juveniles. 29 An anonymous King County Superior Court judge wrote
the CJC in July, 1985, with specific information regarding these contacts by Little.3" But in October of 1985 the CJC again ignored the
allegations, claiming there was "[in]sufficient evidence to substantiate
any violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct or of the terms of the
previous admonishment."'" In May of 1986, the anonymous judge
again wrote to the CJC relaying names of two persons with specific
information about the allegations.3 2 The Executive Director of the
CJC interviewed one of the sources who had "substantial hearsay
information" and documents clearly establishing that at least one
22. Seattle Post-Intelligencer ("Seattle P.I."), Aug. 19, 1988, at Al, col. 2. This report
formed the basis of the King County Prosecutor's Office complaint of October 16, 1981, to the
CdC calling for discipline of Judge Little. Id.
23. Gary Little was elected to the King County Superior Court in 1980. Id. at A6, col. 1.
24. Presiding Judge Scholfield temporarily suspended Judge Little from Juvenile Court duties
pending the outcome of the ensuing investigation. Seattle P.I., Dec. 26, 1988, at A5,col. 2.
Scholfield restored Little to those duties in February 1982 after receiving assurances from the
CJC that the matter had been resolved. Id. See J. Danielson & G. Cody, Report to the
Commission on Judicial Conduct 2 (undated) (copy on file with Washington Law Review); Seattle
P.I., Aug. 19, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
25. J. Danielson & G. Cody, supra note 24, at 13.
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id.
28. Seattle P.I., Sept. 16, 1984, at B3, col. 1; Notice of Elections, King County, Washington,
Sept. 18, 1984.
29. Judge Quinn had never been told of Judge Little's previous temporary suspension. Seattle
P.I., Dec. 26, 1988, at A5,col. 3; Seattle Times, Sept. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 5.
30. J. Danielson & G. Cody, supra note 24, at 19-20.
31. Id. at 22.
32, Id. at 24.
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extra-judicial contact had occurred.33 The Executive Director prepared an event-by-event summary of the 1985 allegations and recommended to the CJC that "[n]othing further be pursued unless or until
someone is identified with specific information that is in [CJC]
jurisdiction .... ,3 Behind closed doors, the CJC voted unanimously
"to close the case and provide no communication to anyone."3 5
The public had not been privy to any of this information because of
CJC confidentiality provisions. Beginning in 1985, however, the
media reported Little's suspension from Juvenile Court, and the secret
1982 admonishment by the CJC.36 Rumors and reports of Little's
activities persisted and, on July 19, 1988, Little announced that he
would not run for reelection to the Superior Court.37 One month
later, a reporter told Little that his newspaper would publish a story
detailing allegations of sexual misconduct by Little before he became a
judge.3 8 That evening, in the county courthouse, Little shot himself.39
A furor in the press, public, and legislature followed, capturing front
page headlines for months. 4
In this charged atmosphere, the Senate Committee on Rules ("Senate Committee") requested unrestricted access to the CJC's Little files
for three senate attorneys. 41 The CJC, citing confidentiality rules,
refused. Hoping to stave off a legislative subpoena, the CJC offered
instead the Danielson/Cody Report, a thirty-seven page summary of
the files prepared by two attorneys hired by the CJC.4 2 Unappeased,
the Senate Committee issued a subpoena duces tecum to the CJC for
33. Id.
34. Id. at 25.
35. Id. This decision was later roundly criticized by the Commission on Washington Courts,
a panel appointed by the Board for Judicial Administration to determine what, if any, changes
would be desirable concerning the selection, retention, and discipline of judges. The Commission
called the CJC's post-1984 actions "questionable," its follow-up "minimal ... and that at a slow
pace," and its response to complainants "at best, perfunctory." Commission on Washington
Courts, Report of Findings and Recommendations on Proposed Legislation 5-6 (Mar. 1989)
(copy on file with Washington Law Review).
36. See, e.g., Seattle Times, May 25, 1985, at Al, col. 6. Judge Little responded to the stories
with letters to local newspapers claiming he had been an "effective and innovative judge" who
took "an active role in monitoring the probation of about 10 percent of the juveniles" that
appeared before him. Seattle Times, July 11, 1985, at A15, col. 6.
37. Seattle P.I., July 20, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
38. Seattle P.I., Aug. 19, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
39. Id.
40. Cox, A Death in Seattle, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 7, 1988, at I, col. I. The story also attracted
national notice and prurient interest. See, e.g., 20/20: The Secret Life of Judge Little (ABC
television broadcast, March 17, 1989) ("[Illicit sex is only half the story.") (transcript on file
with Washington Law Review).
41. Seattle Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
42. Id.
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the files.4 3 Rather than comply, the CJC filed an original action with
the Washington Supreme Court, requesting that the subpoena be
quashed. 44
II.

GARNER V CHERBERG A CRITIQUE

The CJC's action to quash the legislature's subpoena duces tecum
45
drew the. supreme court into the middle of the political maelstrom.
In its decision, the court strove to solve two distinct problems. 4 6 First,
the court tried to balance fairness, which confidentiality is intended to
ensure, with the public's right to know. Second, the court attempted
to preserve the independence of the CJC. The court's solution to both
problems was to quash the subpoena, yet offer legislative leaders the
opportunity to view the Little files in camera with the Chief Justice.
A.

The Stick" The Court Quashes the Subpoena Duces Tecum

The court in Garnerquashed the subpoena duces tecum based on the
legislature's own statute.4 7 The court noted that in similar situations
43. The subpoenaduces tecum, although forcing the CJC's hand, was itself a carefully crafted
compromise gesture. The Senate Committee specified that the review would be conducted in the
offices of the CJC by three senate attorneys; that the CJC could be represented at the review
sessions; and that the CJC could delete the identity of witnesses or victims contained in the
documents. Subpoena Duces Tecum, Wash. State Senate, Committee on Rules Inquiry of the
Commission on Judicial Conduct and the Judge Little Matter, 51st Leg. Reg. Sess. (Oct 24,
1987) (copy on file with Washington Law Review).
44. Seattle Times, Oct. 28, 1988, at Cl, col. 6. The chronology presented in Garner v.
Cherberg of the last few events leading up to the confrontation between the Senate Committee
and the CJC is mistaken. 111 Wash. 2d at 813, 765 P.2d at 1284-85. The court represented that
the CJC offered the Danielson/Cody Report in response to the subpoena. Id. In fact, the CJC
offered the Danielson/Cody Report to two senators by transmittal letter dated October 14, 1988
in a final effort to avert the subpoena, which the committee issued 10 days later. To further
complicate matters, the subpoena was mistakenly dated October 24, 1987, rather than October
24, 1988.
45. The court had not remained entirely above the fray; justices' views on the controversy
had been widely quoted in the press, and not always harmoniously. See, e.g., Tacoma News
Tribune, Sept. 27, 1988, at Al, col. 1 ("In speaking out against the commission's actions on
Little, some justices took issue with Chief Justice Vernon Pearson's spirited defense of the
commission.").
46. This critique focuses on the court's efforts to balance confidentiality with other interests,
as well as the effect of the court's decision on continued confidentiality.
47. Garner, 111 Wash. 2d. 811, 812, 765 P.2d 1284, 1284 (1988). The statute exempted all
pleadings, papers, evidence records, and files of the CJC compiled or obtained during the course
of the investigation from the "public disclosure requirements of ch. 42.17 RCW." WASH. REV.
CODa § 2.64.110 (1989).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 64:955, 1989

other courts have maintained confidentiality of judicial conduct commission files.4 8 The court asserted that without confidentiality, witnesses would be unprotected from retaliation and might hesitate to
come forward, judges would have no reason to step down in silence,
and exposure of the CJC's deliberative process would stifle CJC activity and subject members to external pressures. Such results, the court
claimed, would cripple the CJC, contrary to the citizens' intent in creating the CJC.4 9
In endorsing confidentiality, the court favored the interests of fairness over the information needs of the public.50 Attempting to maintain CJC independence, the court crafted its decision to make it as
inoffensive to the legislature as possible, and to place responsibility for
the decision to quash squarely on the legislature. Instead of citing the
statute, the court could have rested its decision to quash on the confidentiality mandates in the constitution or CJC rules. 5' But to assert
the power of the constitution or the CJC over the power of the legislative subpoena was likely to incite radical reform of the CJC. 2 To
deny the subpoena on the basis of the legislature's own statute was the
court's best hope to diffuse potential legislative backlash.
B.

The Carrot: The Offer to Review the Little Files

Having quashed the subpoena, the court then made a remarkable
offer.53 It invited the Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker
48. Garner, 11 Wash. 2d. at 818, 765 P.2d at 1287 (citing Stern v. Morgenthau, 62 N.Y.2d
331, 465 N.E.2d 349, 476 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1984)).
49. Id. at 821, 765 P.2d at 1289. The court's adoption of these rationales for CJC
confidentiality exemplifies the tendency of courts, legislatures, and judicial conduct commissions
to endorse confidentiality without reconsidering its validity. The court quoted five functions
allegedly served by confidentiality listed in a law review article. Id. at 820, 765 P.2d at 1288
(quoting Shaman & B6gu6, supra note 9, at 760). In repeating the stock reasons for
confidentiality to support its position, the court overlooked or ignored the article's title: "Silence
Isn't Always Golden: Reassessing Confidentiality in the Judicial Disciplinary Process." Shaman
& B6gu6, supra note 9, at 755. The authors questioned the justifications for confidentiality, and
recommended that legislators reconsider the need for confidentiality rules in light of
countervailing policies calling for dissemination of information concerning government officials.
Id. at 796.
50. Inexplicably, the court ended this portion of the opinion declaring that in passing the
1986 amendment to the constitution the citizens "evidenced their desire to increase
confidentiality of [CJC] proceedings .. " Garner v. Cherberg, 111 Wash. 2d 811, 823, 765 P.2d
1284, 1290 (emphasis added). Instead, mandating the termination of confidentiality before the
probable cause hearing was intended to increase openness in disciplinary proceedings for judges
and thus promote more confidence in the judiciary. OFFICE OF THE WASH. SECRETARY OF
STATE, VOTERS & CANDIDATES PAMPHLET 8-9 (6th ed. 1986).

51. Garner, 111 Wash. 2d at 816, 765 P.2d at 1286.
52. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
53. "Bizarre," according to some lawmakers. Seattle Times, Jan. 1, 1989, at A], col. 3.
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of the House of Representatives to join the Chief Justice in inspecting
the Little files "to satisfy themselves of the objectivity of the [Danielson/Cody] report."5 4 The court specified that the CJC would not be
required to disclose any portion of records concerning CJC deliberative or quasi-judicial functions." It declared at the end of the opinion
56
that "[c]omity of this nature is not unprecedented.
Whether intended by the court or not, this compromise satisfied the
public's right, through the legislature, to learn the contents of the Little file. The court also recognized the legislature's legitimate interest
in regulating judicial conduct and initiating constitutional change.5 7
Whether the court was motivated by a desire to accommodate competing interests, or only to preserve CJC independence, the result was
appropriate: it gave individuals responsible to the public an opportunity to audit the Little files.
The court's compromise offer to legislative leaders to view the Little
files, after quashing the subpoena, was its best-if not only-chance to
maintain CJC independence. The justices knew from legislative posturing that if they quashed the subpoena the CJC would either be dismantled,5 8 reformed, 9 or removed from under the wing of the
judiciary and made an independent body.6" On the other hand, not
quashing the subpoena would establish the unpalatable precedent of
the CJC opening up its files upon demand to the legislature. Because
the Senate Committee got much of what it wanted, the court's offer
was perhaps more capitulation than compromise.6" This path was not
54. Garner, 111 Wash. 2d at 823-24, 765 P.2d at 1290. Shortly after the release of the Garner
decision, Chief Justice Callow (who took over as Chief Justice on January 5, 1989) announced in
a strange addendum that he would not censor what the legislative leaders could say about the
materials they saw in the files and that he would not rule out allowing lawyers for the legislature
to view the files with names of witnesses deleted. Seattle Times, Jan. 4, 1989, at B4, col. 1.
55. Garner, 111 Wash. 2d at 824, 765 P.2d at 1290.
56. Id. (quoting Forbes v. Earle, 298 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974)).
57. See WASH. CONST. art. 5, § I (impeachment power); WASH. CONST. art. 23, § 1
(constitutional amendments).
58. All Justices opposed this approach. Tacoma News Tribune, Sept. 27, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
59. An early senate proposal called for opening the process upon finding of "sufficient reason"
rather than "probable cause," open CJC discussion and votes on discipline, and a non-attorney
majority on the CJC. Chief Justice Pearson's response was that the system could grind to a halt
with wide-open discipline, and he took offense at having a majority of non-attorneys in the CJC.
Seattle P.I., Sept. 20, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
60. Seattle Times, Oct. 12, 1988, at DI, col. 3.
61. The subpoena requested: (1) Access to the files for three senate attorneys; (2) with the
names of complainants deleted; (3) to determine what was the appropriate legislative response to
the handling of the Little case. Subpoena Duces Tecum (Oct. 24, 1987). The court quashed the
subpoena, but offered: (1) Access to the files to two legislative leaders (and maybe their attorneys,
see supra note 54); (2) with deliberative processes and attorney-client privileged matters deleted;
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without danger; the court also knew that the contents of the files could
prompt the legislature to eliminate CJC independence. 62
The degree to which the court succeeded in fending off legislative
threats to control the CJC can only be gauged by the legislature's
response.6 3 But the court's solution could not address the continuing
problem of confidentiality-that is a legislative function. Until the
legislature initiates the modification of confidentiality strictures in
Washington to accommodate the competing interests of fairness and
the public's right to know, the court will be relegated to the painful
dual role of unwilling participant in, and arbiter of, these conflicts.
III.

TEMPORARY CONFIDENTIALITY: A SOLUTION TO
SATISFY COMPETING INTERESTS

The Little controversy and the Garner court's response illustrate
that confidentiality has caused a crisis of confidence in the judiciary
and the CJC. 4 Moreover, so long as any CJC proceedings remain
permanently confidential, they preclude checks on CJC discretion.
The solution is to replace the current system with one of "temporary
confidentiality," where confidentiality is maintained while the investigation or fact-finding hearing is in progress. When, however, a complaint is dismissed or the CJC makes a recommendation of discipline
(3) to verify the accuracy of the Danielson/Cody Report. Garner v. Cherberg, 111 Wash. 2d
811, 823-24, 765 P.2d 1284, 1290 (1988).
62. Ironically, the legislature directed its ire against a conduct commission it created, and
confidentiality rules the legislature mandated. Individual legislators railing against CJC secrecy
seldom mentioned this. Senator Talmadge, a recent critic of the CJC's use of confidentiality,
defended secrecy during the 1981 Judiciary Committee discussion. Senator Rasmussen made the
perhaps prophetic observations: "Here everything is secret. There is no public disclosure, there is
no access by the press at all; all actions by this section 12 are privileged. Nobody can touch it
...
I do not see the extra privilege that they need of the protection of all this secrecy."
Talmadge responded: "Senator, I simply do not see it as a problem ...
Sen. J., 1981 Reg.
Sess., 47th Leg., Feb. 11, 1981, Vol. 1 at 314.
63. The legislature proposed a constitutional amendment that left the CJC as an independent
body, sealing the success of the court's approach. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
64. The level of public concern is difficult to gauge. Although the prevalence and duration of
headlines may indicate an underlying public discontent, it could also reflect a continuing
vendetta of the press, which has been accused of "hounding" Little to death. See Seattle Times,
Sept. 18, 1988, at A23, col. 1.
But there are indicia of citizen concern. CJC Chairman Wes Nuxoll acknowledged "extensive
public interest." Seattle Times, Aug 30, 1988, at A1, col. 5; see also Seattle Times, Jan. 12, 1989,
at C4, col. 1 (the Board of Judicial Administration's appointment of the Commission on
Washington Courts to study judicial selection and discipline); Petition to Governor Gardner,
Senate Law and Justice Committee Chair, and the House Judiciary Committee Chair (signed by
over 3,600 citizens, expressing concern and requesting an investigation into the possibility of CJC
misconduct) (copy on file with Washington Law Review).

Confidentiality in Judicial Conduct
to the supreme court, the file would become public. Temporary confidentiality would not detract from fairness, and would satisfy the public's right to know.
Because the public believed that the CJC mishandled the Little
affair behind closed doors, public mistrust of the CJC now undermines
its very purpose: the promotion and maintenance of public faith in the
judiciary.65 Confidentiality thus jeopardizes the very judicial interests
it was intended to protect. The CJC can only gain and retain the public confidence if the public is assured that the CJC is functioning with
vigor and effectiveness. 6 So long as any aspect of CJC proceedings
occurs in secrecy, public mistrust will persist.
Inviolate confidentiality also precludes any check on CJC discretion.67 If the CJC is exercising any discretion in private, anything
could happen: Simple error in judgment, inadequate investigation,
misinterpretation of a rule of judicial conduct, or a subtle extension of
favoritism to a judge when assessing whether or not probable cause
exists.68 It may not happen now, when public attention is focused on
the CJC, but later, when the public is lulled into a false sense of security. The best way to ensure that error or abuse of discretion will be
discovered and corrected is to curtail confidentiality, while still preserving fairness.
A.

The ProposedRule of Temporary Confidentiality

The legislature can resolve the conflict between the need for confidentiality and for openness by allowing both. The problem with the
current CJC scheme is that confidentiality is inviolate; charges dismissed without a finding of probable cause forever escape public scrutiny. This frustrates the public's right to know and the need to check
CJC discretion. These interests can only be satisfied if, at some point
65. "[T]he raison d'etre of the judicial disciplinary system is nothing more or less than the
imperative that the people shall have confidence in their judiciary." Greenberg, The Task of
Judging the Judges, 59 JUDICATURE 458, 462 (1976).
66. See First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 486
(3d Cir. 1986) (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. CJC discretion played a key role in two phases of the CJC handing of the Little case. In
1982, the CJC chose to privately reprimand Judge Little for his ex parte contacts with minors.
Then, in 1984 and 1985, the CJC dismissed charges of further exparte contacts by Little made in
violation of the admonishment terms. In both instances the public was not informed. See supra
notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
68. The statement of one commission's lay member conveys how vulnerable proceedings can
be to abuse of discretion: "I assure you that the Commission members give great weight to the
judge, his or her testimony, and the high position the judge holds in the administration ofjustice.
I believe it is fair to say that we err on the side of the judge, more often than not ... " New York
Commission Protects Judges' Rights, Independence, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Fall 1984, at 5, 5.
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in the process, all files become open. The solution to the conflict
between confidentiality and openness lies in keeping files and investigations confidential temporarily, as long as necessary to preserve fairness, then in opening them to the public. The question is, how long
must the CJC maintain confidentiality before opening the files?
In a system of temporary confidentiality, confidentiality is maintained throughout ongoing judicial conduct proceedings. At the conclusion of the proceedings, however, the files become public. Thus,
the vast majority of investigative files dismissed before a finding of
probable cause would become available to the public upon dismissal.69
If further proceedings are warranted, the CJC would continue its
investigation and hold a confidential fact-finding hearing.7" At the
end, the entire file would be opened, whether the hearing resulted in
dropped charges, admonishment or reprimand of the judge, or recommendation to the supreme court for discipline or retirement. This
temporary confidentiality approach would provide fairness during the
pendency of all complaints, yet guarantee the public check on CJC
discretion by granting review of all CJC actions upon complaint
resolution. 7

69. See infra note 99. The timing of the release might be adjusted to accommodate two
possible abuses of the system. Litigants, hedging their bets in a losing effort, could file nuisance
complaints against the judge, knowing that he or she would be aware of the publicized dismissed
charges. This strategy to establish prejudice as a grounds for reversal could be avoided by
withholding public release of the files until the end of the litigation. Similarly, the system could
be subject to attempts at pre-election abuse. Inflammatory complaints could be filed before an
election in the hope that, even though dismissed, the publicity would injure the judge. To
prevent this, any complaint filed within a set number of months preceding an election, but
dismissed before the election, could be kept confidential until voting has ended.
70. As it was under the pre-1986 amendment. See WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31 (1980, amend.
71).
71. The Washington Medical Disciplinary Board system for investigating and acting on
complaints against physicians presents a well-tested model of temporary confidentiality. When a
complaint is filed against a physician, the name of the complainant, nature of the complaint, and
details of the investigation all remain confidential until the investigation is complete. WASH.
REv. CODE § 42.17.310(l)(d) (1989). Then, if there is reason to believe that a code violation
occurred, an open hearing is conducted. Id. § 18.130.090. Otherwise, the complaint is dismissed
and the file made public. The identity of the complainant, and facts about the physician
unrelated to the complaint, can be, for compelling reasons, kept permanently confidential. Id.
§ 42.17.310(2). Any of these protections can be overruled if, after a hearing with notice to every
person with an interest, the superior court decides that the exemption of such records is "clearly
unnecessary" to protect any individual's right of privacy or any vital government interest. Id.
§ 42.17.310(3). This approach to confidentiality could be used by the CJC, with a probable cause
standard to replace reason to believe. The model would not afford the judiciary all the
protections it needs, however, as the public fact-finding hearings could subject CJC members to
undue pressures, and the judges to an unfair media circus. See infra notes 92, 96.
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B.

Temporary Confidentiality Ensures Fairness

Temporary confidentiality protects the public interest by ensuring
that all files become open at some point. Temporary confidentiality
also ensures fairness. To demonstrate this, the system must be evaluated in light of traditional justifications for inviolate confidentiality.
1. Protect Complainantsfrom Publicity or the Possibility of Judicial
Retribution
That inviolate confidentiality protects complainants from publicity
and judicial retribution is largely a myth. The vast majority of complainants are litigants, their families, and private citizens.72 Many can
wait to file a complaint with the CJC until their litigation ends. Those
who do not wait are aware that the CJC notifies the judge of the investigation and the nature of the charge.73 They also know that the judge
might discern their identity from the basis of the charges.74 If the CJC
finds probable cause, complainants cannot reasonably expect to
remain anonymous during the inquiry, as their identity may be deducible from the facts or they may be asked to testify.7 5
Attorney-complainants, 6 for the reasons just discussed, similarly
should not expect to remain anonymous. 7 An attorney is familiar
with standards of judicial conduct and thus should be less likely to file
a frivolous complaint. Given the greater reliability of their complaints, attorneys should have the expectation that probable cause will
be found, and their identities revealed." Temporary confidentiality,
72. This class represented 321 of the 376 complaints to the CJC from 1985 to 1988. See
WASHINGTON COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 14.

73. CJC RULE 6(b) (rev. May 5, 1989).
74. Shaman & Bfgu6, supra note 9, at 760.
75. That complainants desire confidentiality is speculative, anyway. In Wisconsin, for
instance, only about 10% ask that their names be withheld. Burnham, loth National Conference
Held, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Fall 1986, at 1, 2.
76. Lawyers filed only 31 of the 376 complaints to the CJC from 1985 to 1988. WASHINGTON
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 14. Arguably these complaints
should be encouraged the most, as attorneys have a developed sense of what constitutes judicial
misconduct, and are more likely to witness misconduct because of their time spent in courts.
77. Attorneys' fears of judicial retribution are not completely unfounded and should not be
minimized, especially in non-urban areas where the judge is "The Law" in town. Burnham, loth
NationalConference Held, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Fall 1986, at 1, 3 (comments of Judge Gafni of
Philadelphia).
78. In Washington, an attorney's duty to report judicial misconduct is ambiguous; the duty
should be clarified. Washington rules state that "[a] lawyer having knowledge that a judge has
committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct ... should promptly inform the
appropriate authority."

WASH.

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT Rule 8.3(b) (1989)

(emphasis added). Note that the corresponding American Bar Association model rule reads
"shall inform." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(b) (1983) reprintedin T.
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therefore, eliminates no safeguards for complainants because the protections of inviolate confidentiality are illusory.7 9

2.

Protect the Reputation of Innocent Judges

Proponents claim that inviolate confidentiality protects judges from
the devastating effects of publicizing frivolous complaints.8" This
argument assumes that frivolous charges would damage a judge's reputation. This might be true under a system of immediate openness
where complaints become public when filed. Some complainants do
make extremely serious, but baseless allegations8 1 that could injure a
judge's reputation or in-court effectiveness if published before declared
unfounded. 2
Temporary confidentiality would protect the reputations of innocent
judges just as well as inviolate confidentiality. By keeping complaints
MORGAN AND R. ROTUNDA, 1988 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

174 (1988). The Chairperson of the Illinois Judicial Board posited that judges and lawyers who
fail to report should themselves be disciplined. Workshop on Off-Bench Conduct Held, JUD.
CONDUCT REP., Fall 1985, at 1, 4. Health care professionals are subject to license suspension or
revocation for failure to report a physician's unprofessional conduct or disability. WASH. REV.
CODE § 18.72.165(1), (3) (1989). Perhaps the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct should
be brought into conformance with the model rules, to clarify to the judge the attorney's duty.
The judge may feel less vindictive towards individuals compelled to complain.
79. If necessary, complainants' identities could be kept confidential for compelling reasons, as
in the Washington Medical Disciplinary Board model. See supra note 71.
80. Gillis & Fieldman, Michigan's Unitary System of JudicialDiscipline: A Comparison with
Illinois' Two-Tier Approach, 54 CHL-KENT L. REV. 117, 120 (1977). A related argument,
commonly made, is that confidentiality preserves reputations by allowing private reprimands for
minor indiscretions. While confidential discipline may protect individual judges, the system
jeopardizes the integrity of the entire judiciary by undermining the public's confidence in it.
Private discipline allows disposal of complaints with a wink and a nod-a private joke at public
expense. As the then-Executive Secretary of the California Commission on Judicial
Qualifications stated, "[s]ometimes there may be reason to accept the plea, 'I didn't do it but I'll
see it doesn't happen again.'" Frankel, The Casefor JudicialDisciplinaryMeasures, 49 J. AM.
JUDICATURE Soc'Y 218, 221 (1966). Private discipline also ignores the public's right to know
about misconduct of the elected judiciary. Without information about judicial indiscretions, the
public check by election is enervated.
As the CJC abolished private reprimands in 1989, the above concerns are now moot in
Washington. CJC RULE 19 (rev. May 5, 1989). The proposed amendment would also eliminate
private sanctions. Engrossed Substitute S.J. Res. 8202 4, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989). See infra
notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
81. For example, the Michigan commission has received unfounded complaints accusing
judges of running prostitution houses and dope dens. Gillis & Fieldman, supra note 80, at 120.
82. Whether unscreened publicized complaints, frivolous or otherwise, injure a judge's
reputation is speculative. One woman spent 18 days parading in front of the Pierce County
Courthouse before a primary election with signs accusing a judge of obstructing justice and file

tampering. See Public Hearing for the Commission on Washington Courts 74, 76 (Jan. 24, 1989)
(statement of J. Anderson). She complained that in spite of her protest the local newspaper
endorsed the judge's reelection bid. Id. at 106 (Feb. 16, 1989). Unscreened complaints seem to be
more nuisance than threat.
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confidential until disposition, the CJC will already have declared the
complaint meritless. Thus, the judge will have the benefit of exoneration by the CJC. The press probably would ignore the publicized complaint;83 and even if reported, the electorate will readily discern and
dismiss the complaint as unfounded or unsubstantiated.
To ensure that the judges are in fact fully protected by the CJC's
determination, under a system of temporary confidentiality the CJC
could expand its role as educator and ombudsman. That ninety percent of all complaints are readily dismissed reveals a rooted public
ignorance of, or frustration with, "the system." Explaining carefully
and openly why a judge was not disciplined would heighten public
awareness of appropriate judicial conduct.84 More importantly,
allowing the public to see that many of the complaints are without
merit can only reinforce the perception that the vast majority of judges
in Washington are serving the public well.

83. "[I]f
you want to get reporters off your case, put it all on the table. They will get bored."
Id. at 23 (Feb. 16, 1989) (statement of Seattle Times Managing Editor). Although this statement
may seem unbelievable after the relentless attention the Little case has received, it is not without
support. A recent Washington Medical Disciplinary Board hearing involved a physician who
allegedly listened and did nothing on the telephone while a known-suicidal patient announced
that he was taking an overdose of medication. She wrote in the chart the next day: "patient died,
overdose." When she learned of his survival, she obliterated the entry. These are serious
allegations against a professional of stature in the community, yet the story was relegated to page
D4. Seattle Times, Feb. 16, 1989, at D4, col. 1.
84. The Commission on Washington Courts identified this deficiency in the current method
of responding to complaints: "[TI]he manner in which the CJC responded to complainants in the
Little case and other cases has been, at best, perfunctory .... [I]t
would not be unjustified to
describe many of the CJC responses, particularly those involving form letters, as insensitive."
Commission on Washington Courts, supra note 35, at 6.
The institution of ombudsman, prevalent in Scandinavia, the U.K., Canada, and New Zealand
presents an excellent partial model for the CJC to follow when dismissing complaints. An
ombudsman is an accessible, independent, impartial expert on government, empowered with
extensive investigatory powers to review and, if appropriate, criticize, publicize, and explain
government actions. Hill, The Self-Perceptions of Ombudsmen: A Comparative Survey, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF THE OMBUDSMAN: EVOLUTION AND PRESENT FUNCTION 43
(G. Caiden ed. 1983). The courts are within the ombudsman's purview in Sweden and Finland.
Anderson, JudicialAccountability: Scandinavia, California & the US.A., 28 AM. J. COMP. L.
393, 394 (1980). The ombudsman explains to complainants why the official action was correct,
even if it was misunderstood and a sense of injustice lingers. To remove public doubts is
considered as important as to correct wrongdoing. The ombudsman is reducing friction between
government and citizen. In nine out of ten cases, the government body has in the ombudsman a
public relations officer who justifies its actions to persons who feel aggrieved at them. Pickl,
Investigating Complaints: A Comment, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF THE OMBUDSMAN:
EVOLUTION AND PRESENT FUNCTION 92 (G. Caiden ed. 1983). It is this attribute of the
ombudsman that the CJC could adopt.
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Encourage Retirement

Commentators claim that errant judges are more likely to resign or
retire if their misconduct is kept secret until formal action is recommended, rather than made public. 5 This argument implies that if files
were open upon disposition, a judge who knows the charges are true
and removal is warranted might decide to fight, knowing that retiring
or resigning could be construed as an admission of guilt.
If it is true that fewer judges would be encouraged to silently step
down under a system of temporary confidentiality, this disadvantage
would be outweighed by confidence gained in the judiciary from opening up the system to the public. But temporary confidentiality would
offer a judge some protections. It would allow a judge to leave office
voluntarily, before the substance of the charge is known, with the
option of avoiding much of the negative publicity. The file would
become public only after the judge had stepped down, dissipating
much of the adverse reaction. This solution, although not ideal for the
judge, strikes a fair balance which benefits the judiciary as a whole by
assuring the public that the CJC is handling judicial misbehavior.
4. Avoid Media Exploitation
Open CJC investigations or fact-finding hearings can be exploited
by the media, and thereby jeopardize a judge's reputation or the integrity of the judiciary. For example, in a California proceeding, Associate Supreme Court Justice Mosk sought to quash a subpoena ordering
him to appear as a witness at public hearings before the California
Commission on Judicial Performance ("CJP").86 The CJP was investigating allegations that one or more California Supreme Court justices improperly delayed the filing of controversial decisions until after
an election in which four Supreme Court justices were on the ballot.8 7
Because of the spectacular nature of the charges and attendant publicity (the allegations were leaked to the press), the CJP asked the Judicial Council to modify confidentiality requirements to allow

85. See, e.g., W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11, at 89, 94.
86. Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 601 P.2d 1030, 1030, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 497
(1979).
87. 601 P.2d at 1033 n.1, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 497 n.1.
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commission proceedings to be publicly conducted after the preliminary investigation. 88 The hearings present a stunning example of public judicial discipline turning into a media circus8 9 which ended with
no formal charges filed against any supreme court justice. 90
This threat of media distortion can be avoided by retaining confidentiality through the fact-finding hearing, and only thereafter opening the record.9 1 Whether the CJC elects to dismiss the charges,
admonish or reprimand the judge, or recommend discipline to the
supreme court, delayed openness grants the public its right to know.
The judge still receives the protection of a private fact-finding hearing;
the opening of a file simultaneously with CJC conclusions prevents
rampant pre-decision speculation which could cause irreparable damage to a judge's reputation.9 2
5. Protect Commission Members from Outside Pressures
The claim that confidentiality protects commission members from
outside pressures93 has never received widespread endorsement. There
is no factual support for the claim that the CJC is more susceptible
than any other governmental body to outside pressures.9 4 If it were,
rules easily could be adopted to prohibit attempts to unduly influence
commissioners' adjudicative functions. 9 5 Because temporary confidentiality insulates both the judge and CJC members until the end of
88. Id. at 1039 n.ll, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 503 n.ll. The California Supreme Court held that the
Judicial Council could not authorize public hearings. Id. at 1047-48, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
89. [Ihe California Commission on Judicial Performance... marched into the evening
television news to conduct a probable cause hearing. Internal operating procedures of the
California Supreme Court were dragged into public view; personal opinions, habits and
prejudices of the members of the supreme court were revealed and explored. The minutiae
of the deliberative process were unveiled and discussed, the public entertained and titillated,
and the California Supreme Court extensively damaged.
Cameron, The CaliforniaSupreme Court Hearings--A Tragedy That Should and Could Have
Been Avoided, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 11, 18 (1980).
90. Id. at 15.
91. This protection is significant when compared to the current system, where the hearing
would have been public. CJC RULE 8 (rev. May 5, 1989).
92. To the extent that this proposal guarantees the judiciary a fair and dignified fact-finding
hearing, yet still protects the public, it is superior to the medical disciplinary board model, which
would open the process to the public after the initial investigation. See supra note 71.
93. Stern v. Morgenthau, 62 N.Y.2d 331,465 N.E.2d 349, 353, 476 N.Y.S.2d 810, 814 (1984).
94. Shaman & BWgu, supra note 9, at 765. Ironically, there has been speculation that in the
Little case powerful people influenced-and for years silenced-the press, not the CJC. Brown,
Seattle'sPress and the Case of the Judge Who KilledHimself COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan./
Feb. 1989, at 31, 31.
95. Shaman & BWgu6, supra note 9, at 765-66.
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factfinding or until dismissal, the threat of outside pressures is
minimized. 96

C.

The Washington Legislative and CJC Proposals:Missed
Opportunities

In May of 1989, the CJC amended its rules, abolishing confidential
admonishment or reprimand.9 7 But this action only addresses one
facet of the confidentiality problem. The CJC is still screening complaints out of the public eye, publicizing the charges only upon a finding of probable cause.98 The public still obtains no knowledge of, and
consequently has no check on, CJC discretion in the overwhelming
majority of complaints.99
The legislature responded to the Garnerdecision" ° with a proposed
constitutional amendment" ° ' and statute 10 2 that fail adequately to
address confidentiality concerns, and leave the CJC independent of the
legislature.' 3 If adopted by the voters, the constitutional amendment
96. The argument that commission members would be susceptible to outside pressures might
apply under a model similar to the Medical Disciplinary Board, where the hearing would be open
and members of the CJC exposed to possible public pressures. See supra note 71.
97. CJC RULE 19 (rev. May 5, 1989). The change was probably an attempt to forestall
legislative response.
98. This is not to suggest that the CJC has been less than competent judging other charges.
But the fact that hundreds of CJC files are closed to outside scrutiny impedes validation. See
Anderson, supra note 84, at 408.
99. The CJC labeled 90% of the complaints disposed of from 1985 to 1988 as "legal matter,"
"prior to jurisdiction," "lack of jurisdiction," "no violation," "no disability," or
"unsubstantiated." WASHINGTON COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 1988 ANNUAL
REPORT 18.

100. Final response. The initial response of individual legislators to the Garner decision was
immediate, and extreme. See, e.g., Seattle Times, Dec. 30, 1988, at A], col. 2 (Senator
Rasmussen's proposal, the day the decision was published, of a constitutional amendment);
Seattle Times, Jan. 18, 1989, at H5, col. I (bill introduced to abolish the CJC).
101. It is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze the proposed constitutional changes
beyond those concerning confidentiality. The constitutional amendment would (among other
changes): Increase the lay membership of the CJC from four to six, giving lay members a
majority over the three judges and two attorneys, Engrossed Substitute S.J. Res. 8202 1, 51st
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989); award the CJC censure power, and make all CJC disciplinary actions
public, id. at 4; provide for a public, stipulated settlement between the judge or justice and the
CJC or the court, id. at 7; and mandate the hiring of one or more investigative officers, who
would report directly to the CJC, id. at 9.
102. Commission on Judicial Conduct, 1989 Wash. Legis. Serv. 367 (West). The
implementing statute would go into effect only if the constitutional amendment passes. Id. § 12.
The statute supplements the amendment language regarding confidentiality and would add an
explicit directive making all pleadings, papers, evidence records, and files of the CJC, including
complaints and the identity of complainants "exempt from the public disclosure requirements of
chapter 42.17 RCW" during the investigation or initial proceeding. Id. § 6. Further, any person
violating a CJC rule on confidentiality would be subject to a proceeding for contempt. Id § 9.
103. Thus sealing the success of the court's Garner opinion.
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will allow the CJC to continue establishing rules "for commission proceedings including due process and confidentiality of proceedings."'"
The constitution, if the amendment passes, will still mandate confidentiality through the probable cause stage.10 5 The sole change affecting
current CJC confidentiality rules will be that all records providing the
basis for 6the CJC's conclusion that probable cause exists will be made
0
public.'
The proposed changes would in some measure increase the accountability of the CJC. But to the extent that the amendment fails to
address the fundamental conflict brought on by confidentiality, and
retains an initial period of inviolate confidentiality, the legislature has
failed to protect completely the public interest.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Inviolate confidentiality in judicial conduct commission proceedings, as demonstrated by the Little controversy and the Garnercourt's
response, threatens to undermine the interests confidentiality is
intended to protect. Temporary confidentiality-a process of confidential proceedings later made public-need not be greeted with dread
by the elected judiciary; such a system preserves fairness while satisfying the public's right to know. Temporary confidentiality guarantees
both that judges receive a private and dignified fact-finding hearing
and that the public eventually will have access to the files. Competent
judges have nothing to hide and, therefore, nothing to fear from an
after-the-fact opening of the system to the public; greater openness
stimulates more confidence, not less. 107 Openness allows a public
check' 018 on the activities of the CJC: vigilance, not vigilantism.
Judge Cardozo said "new times and new manners may call for new
standards and new rules."'0 9 The Little case demonstrated that a new
rule is needed; unfortunately the legislature's proposed amendment is
not an adequate new rule as it maintains inviolate confidentiality
through a probable cause finding. Washington was the last state to
adopt a judicial conduct commission; it could take the lead and be the
104. Engrossed Substitute S.J. Res. 8202 1 10, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess.'(1989). The proposed
constitutional amendment will go before the voters in November, 1989.
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id at 3.
107. Burnham, 10th National Conference Held, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Fall 1986, at 1, 2.
108. As Justice Brandeis said, "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY 62 (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933)).
109. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 88 (1921).
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first to adopt temporary confidentiality. This would both protect the
fairness of the system and restore confidence in the judiciary by
allowing the public to watch the watchdog. To implement temporary
confidentiality would be "an appropriate end to the present
situation."'

"o

Tom Montgomery

110. Judge Little's suicide note. Seattle P.I., Aug. 20, 1988, at A1, col. 1.
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